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FIFTH CIRCUIT EXPANDS 'NOT SUBSTANTIALLY
DEVELOPED' EXCEPTION TO FERC JURISDICTION
UNDER THE NATURAL GAS ACT OF 1938
NATURAL GAS-JURISDICTION. The FERC does not have jurisdiction over the sale of leases covering proven reserves of natural
gas that lack the imminent ability to produce in commercial quantities. El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Sun Oil Co., 708 F.2d 1011 (5th
Cir. 1983).
INTRODUCTION
The federal government regulates the price of natural gas if the gas
was transported or sold in interstate commerce before arriving at the
consumer's home.' The federally regulated price is normally lower than
the prevailing free market price. 2 Because of this gap between the regulated and unregulated prices for natural gas, there is an obvious economic
incentive for gas producers to avoid federal regulatory jurisdiction and
to sell their gas at the higher, unregulated price.
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), formerly known
as the Federal Power Commission (FPC), 3 regulates the price of natural
gas coming within its jurisdiction; this power to regulate is derived from
the Natural Gas Act of 1938.' In passing this act, Congress limited the
FERC's regulatory jurisdiction to two areas: (1) interstate transportation
or sale of natural gas; and (2) companies engaged in such interstate
transportation or sale. 5 The act explicitly excludes the "production and
gathering" of natural gas from FERC jurisdiction. 6 One method producers
have used to bring their sales into the production and gathering exception
and avoid FERC jurisdiction is to sell the leases under which the gas is
produced rather than the gas itself.
The Supreme Court initially put its stamp of approval upon this practice
in PanhandleEastern Pipeline Co. v. FederalPower Comm' n,7 noting in
passing that "of course leases are an essential part of production," 8 and
1. The Natural Gas Act of 1938, 15 U.S.C. 717(b) (1982).
2. See infra notes 36-38.
3. The functions of the FPC were transferred to the FERC under the Department of Energy
Organization Act, 42 U.S.C. 7172 (1982). For simplicity, all references to the FPC (except in case
names) have been changed to FERC.
4. 15 U.S.C. 717-717(w) (1982).
5. Id.at 717(b).
6. The provisions of tile Act "shall not apply to any other transportation or sale of natural gas
or to the local distribution of natural gas or to the facilities used for such distribution or to the
production or gathering of natural gas." Id.
7. 337 U.S. 498 (1949).
8. Id.at 505.
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thereby bringing leases within the production and gathering exception to
FERC jurisdiction. However, in United Gas Improvement Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 9 commonly referred to as Rayne Field, the Supreme Court
held that a sale of gas leases which is the economic equivalent of a sale
of proven and substantially developed reserves of gas is subject to FERC
jurisdiction, even though production and gathering have not been completed. 0
El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Sun Oil Co." involved the Fifth Circuit's
interpretation of Rayne Field and in particular the court's interpretation
of the phrase "proven and substantially developed" as a test of FERC
jurisdiction under the Natural Gas Act. An interstate pipeline company
purchased gas leases from independent producers in the San Juan Basin
of northwestern New Mexico. 2 For twenty years preceding this litigation,
the parties had treated their transactions as within the "production and
gathering" exception, and the pipeline's California customers had paid
higher rates for their gas. In 1973, the pipeline company sought to bring
the lease purchases within FERC's jurisdiction. " If successful, the suit
would have forced the producers (and their successors) to accept the
lower regulated price for the gas produced from the San Juan Basin, and
possibly to refund twenty years' worth of excess payments (payments in
excess of the regulated rates over those twenty years).' 4
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held the El Paso lease sale was
within the "production and gathering" exception to FERC jurisdiction.' 5
The court interpreted Rayne Field to mean that a lease transfer was only
within FERC jurisdiction if the leases were "proven and substantially
developed" at the time of transfer. The court interpreted that phrase to
require the leasehold be sufficiently developed to have the imminent
ability to produce in commercial quantities. 6 The El Paso court then held
that the ratio of gas wells existing at the time of the lease sale to the
number of gas wells expected at full development was too low for the
court to find the leasehold had the imminent ability to produce in commercial quantities.' 7
9. 381 U.S. 392 (1965).
10. Id. at 401-02.
I1. 708 F.2d 1011 (5th Cir 1983).
12. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 6 F.E.R.C. P63,037 at 20 and 39-40. [The opinion is available
on LEXIS. Because I am unable to obtain a hardcopy of the administrative law judge's opinion, the
page numbers given in reference to 6 F.E.R.C. P63,037 are actually LEXIS screen numbers.]
13. El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Sun Oil Co., 426 F. Supp. 963, 965 (W.D. Tex. 1977).
14. 6 F.E.R.C. P63,037 at pg. 6.
15. 708 F.2d at 1018.
16. Id. at 1017, following Continental Oil Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, normally referred to
as Ship Shoal, 370 F.2d 57 (5th Cir. 1966).
17. 708 F.2d at 1017.
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FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The El Paso Natural Gas Company (El Paso) is an interstate pipeline
company subject to federal jurisdiction under the Natural Gas Act of
1938. In the mid-1940s, El Paso realized that Southern California demand
for its natural gas would outstrip El Paso's supply of casinghead gas18
from the Permian Basin of western Texas and eastern New Mexico. 9 El
Paso sought new gas reserves in the San Juan Basin of northwestern New
Mexico. The San Juan Basin was particularly attractive to El Paso because
of its proximity to the Southern California market and El Paso's existing
gas pipeline.2"
In August 1947, El Paso filed for FERC certification of a gas pipeline
from the San Juan Basin to Southern California, and sought to purchase
gas reserves from producers in the San Juan. 2 In May 1948, El Paso
entered into a gas purchase agreement with Delhi, an independent gas
producer with substantial reserves in the San Juan's Barker Dome formation. 22 The purchase contract would become effective only if El Paso
received FERC certification for its California pipeline and if Delhi obtained an FERC determination that the contract would not make Delhi a
jurisdictional gas producer under the Natural Gas Act. 23 When Delhi was
unable to obtain a definite FERC opinion on the jurisdiction question, El
Paso and Delhi sought the advice of former FERC general counsel Charles
Shannon. Shannon advised that the FERC would not have jurisdiction
over the transaction if Delhi sold El Paso the gas lease itself rather than
the gas produced under the lease. 24 El Paso and Delhi then re-wrote their
agreement into a gas lease agreement (GLA) under which El Paso undertook to produce and develop the gas covered by the leases.
In 1951, El Paso sought additional gas reserves to maintain its market
position as the primary gas supplier to the booming California market.25
El Paso again approached Delhi, which had San Juan Basin reserves large
enough to meet El Paso's supply needs. After several months of negotiations, El Paso and Delhi executed GLA-47 in January 1952.26 GLA47 set a standard followed by El Paso in obtaining additional gas reserves
18. "Casinghead gas" is gas produced in connection with the production of oil. Phillips Petroleum
Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672, 674 (1954).
19. 6 F.E.R.C. P63,037 at 19.
20. Id. at 20.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.at 21.
24. Id.at 27.
25. Id.at 38.
26. Id.at 39-40.
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in the San Juan. 27 In particular, GLA-47 gave Delhi an overriding royalty
payment (override) 2 on all gas produced, setting the override payment
for the first ten years and providing for redetermination of the override
every five years thereafter. If the parties were unable to agree to the
redetermined override, arbitrators were to set the price at the fair market
value at the wellhead. 29 GLA-47 also contained both favored nations3"
and take-or-pay clauses. 3
El Paso and Delhi closed GLA-47 in March 1952. Gas from the leasehold began moving through El Paso's interstate pipeline to California that
same month.3 2 El Paso acquired an additional thirty-five GLAs from other
gas producers in the San Juan, on terms substantially identical to GLA47.33 Thirty-five of the thirty-six GLAs acquired by El Paso after 1951
were at issue in this case. 34
GLA-61 called for redetermination of the override in 1973. El Paso
and Sun Oil Company (Sun), the holder of GLA-61, could not agree on
the override amount, and they submitted the issue to arbitration per the
terms of the contract.35 The arbitrators awarded Sun an override of $.40
per Mcf.3 6 This rate was below the $.55-.60 per Mcf rate for wholly
intrastate gas 37 and substantially above the regulated interstate rate of $.24
per Mcf. 3' El Paso's other GLA holders then sought to have their overrides
raised to $.40 per Mcf under the favored nations clauses in their GLAs.39
El Paso brought four declaratory actions in the U.S. District Court for
the District of Columbia to bring the San Juan area GLAs under the
FERC's jurisdiction.40 If successful, the actions would have forced the
GLA holders to obtain FERC approval of override payments in excess
27. Id. at 38.
28. An "overriding royalty" is a payment to a third person from the lessee's working interest,
free and clear of any expense incident to production and sale of oil or gas produced from the
leasehold. DeMik v. Cargill, 485 P.2d 229, 232 (Okla. 1971).
29. 6 F.E.R.C. P63,037 at 41.
30. Id. at 41. A "favored nations" clause gives the producer the right to be paid at the highest
rate being paid by the purchaser to any other producer in the same field. Texas Gas Transmission
Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 363 U.S. 263, 274 (1960).
31. 6 F.E.R.C. P63,037 at 30 n. 40. Under a "take-or-pay" clause, the lessee must pay for a
specified minimum volume of gas whether that volume is actually produced or not. Id.
32. Id. at 44.
33. Id. at 45.
34. While 35 of the 36 GLAs were involved in the F.E.R.C. hearing, only 14 GLAs and one
PLA (Pacific Lease Agreement, an agreement with Northwest Pipeline Corporation) were involved
in the earlier Midland district court decision. See 6 F.E.R.C. P63,037 at 45-46; Brief of appellee
at 9, n. 29.
35. El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Sun Oil Co., 708 F.2d 1011, 1014 (5th Cir. 1983).
36. Mcf is an abbreviation for thousand cubic feet. Webster's Third International Dictionary 1397
(1976).
37. Brief of appellees at 18, El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Sun Oil Co., 708 F.2d 1011 (5th Cir.
1983).
38. Brief of appellant at 4, n. 4, El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Sun Oil Co., 708 F.2d 1011 (5th
Cir. 1983).
39. 426 F. Supp. 963, 968 (W.D. Tex. 1977).
40. Id. at 965.
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of the regulated interstate rate, and possibly to refund part of the payments
made under the GLAs to gas consumers in California and the Pacific
Northwest. 4
The cases were consolidated and moved to the Federal District Court
for the Western District of Texas at Midland.42 In June 1974, El Paso
filed a complaint with the FERC to begin show-cause proceedings against
the GLA holders on the jurisdiction issue. On the same day El Paso
moved the Midland court to stay the proceedings pending the FERC's
determination on its jurisdiction. 3 Instead, the FERC stayed its proceedings and the district court went forward with the trial." The district court
ruled the GLA sales were not Rayne Field equivalents to gas sales and
that the FERC lacked jurisdiction over the GLA transactions.4 5
In June 1977, the FERC began a show cause proceeding on the jurisdiction question, stating it was not bound by the Midland court's jurisdictional determination.46 FERC found the GLA transactions equivalent
to gas purchases in interstate commerce.47 Appeals from both the Midland
district court and the FERC were consolidated before the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals. The Fifth Circuit court determined the lease sales were
not jurisdictional sales because the leases were not substantially developed
at the time of the sale. The Fifth Circuit's opinion is important because
the court interpreted the Supreme Court's Rayne Field decision in a
manner which broadened the "production and gathering" exception to
the FERC's jurisdiction. In addition, the record on which the Fifth Circuit
reached this decision merits examination when trying to determine what
is and what is not within the "production and gathering" exception to
the FERC's jurisdiction.
LEGAL BACKGROUND
The earliest Supreme Court decision dealing with FERC jurisdiction
over hybrid 48 gas transactions was FederalPower Comm'n v. Panhandle
41. 6 F.E.R.C. P63,037 at 6.
42. The transfer was made under the cure of venue defects provisions of 28 U.S.C. 1406(a)
(1982). 708 F.2d at 1014.
43. F.P.C. Docket No. 74-314. Brief of Appellant at pg. 5.
44. This case of apparent "reverse primary jurisdiction" arose because the FPC did not want to
burden the litigants with dual proceedings. Amicus brief of F.E.R.C. at 10b, El Paso Natural Gas
Co. v. Sun Oil Co., 708 F.2d 1011 (5th Cir. 1983).
45. El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Sun Oil Co., 426 F. Supp. 963 (W.D. Tex. 1977).
46. Order Instituting Show Cause Proceeding, Ordering Filing of Evidence and Ordering Hearing,
El Paso Natural Gas Co., et al., Docket Nos. CP74-314 et al., 58 F.P.C. 2181 (1977). See Amicus
Brief of the F.E.R.C. at pg. 6, El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Sun Oil Co., 708 F.2d 1011 (5th Cir.
1983).
47. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 12 F.E.R.C. P61,297 (1980).
48. "Hybrid" refers to transactions which manifest characteristics of both a normal wellhead sale
of gas and of lease transfers. El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Sun Oil Co., 708 F.2d at 1016. FERC has
jurisdiction over wellhead sales of gas but its jurisdiction does not extend to cover a normal landowner's lease or its royalty payments. Mobil Oil Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 463 F.2d 256
(D.C. Cir. 1972).
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Eastern Pipeline Co. 49 Panhandle was an interstate pipeline company
which successfully avoided FERC jurisdiction over a sale of its gas reserves. Panhandle formed a subsidiary corporation (Hugoton) and transferred gas leases to Hugoton for all of Hugoton's stock.5" Hugoton then
sold the gas from the leases to Kansas Power and Light. Because the
leases covered 97,000 acres entirely within Kansas, and because Hugoton
was not a jurisdictional gas company,51 the deal was entirely intrastate
and supposedly outside of FERC jurisdiction.5 2
The Supreme Court agreed with Panhandle. The Court interpreted the
Natural Gas Act as supplementary to, and not preemptive of, state regulation of intrastate natural gas. 53 The Court found the FERC lacked
jurisdiction over the Panhandle-Hugoton-Kansas Power and Light transaction because the transaction was within the production and gathering
exception to the Natural Gas Act. The Court noted that "of course, leases
are an essential part of production.51
Subsequently, in PhillipsPetroleum Co. v. Wisconsin 5 (PhillipsI), the
Supreme Court held FERC had jurisdiction to regulate the price at which
independent producers sold gas to interstate pipelines for transportation
or resale in interstate commerce. Prior to PhillipsI, the FERC had placed
sales by independent producers within the production and gathering exception. 5 6The Court expressly rejected the contention that the "production
and gathering" exception referred to the business of producing and gathering gas, with a sale an integral part of the business.57 The Court interpreted the FERC's jurisdiction under the Natural Gas Act to fill the gap
in regulation of gas companies caused by court decisions striking down
state attempts to regulate interstate transfers of gas.58 In his concurring
opinion, Justice Frankfurter suggested reading into the act that its purpose
is to occupy the field where the states cannot constitutionally act. 59 Under
Phillips I, the FERC's jurisdiction begins where the states' power to
regulate ends, and thus any transaction within the "production and gathering" exception should be subject to state regulation.
In United Gas Improvement Co. v. Continental Oil Co.,' commonly
known as the "Rayne Field" decision, the essential question was whether
49. 337 U.S. 498 (1949).
50. Id. at 500.
51. A jurisdictional company is one subject to the FERC's regulatory jurisdiction under the Natural
Gas Act of 1938.
52. 337 U.S. 498, 500 (1949).
53. Id. at 502-03.
54. Id. at 505.
55. 347 U.S. 672, 677 (1954).
56. Id. at 677.
57. Id. at 681.
58. Id. at 683.
59. Id. at 686.
60. 381 U.S. 392 (1965).
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Phillips I should be extended to sales of leases covering proven and
substantially developed gas reserves to a jurisdictional gas company. The
Court found such a lease sale was the economic equivalent of a gas sale
jurisdictional under PhillipsI and held the lease sale was subject to FERC
jurisdiction. 6'
In 1957, Texas Eastern, a jurisdictional interstate pipeline company,
executed62 gas purchase contracts with Continental Oil Company and other
producers (Continental) to buy gas produced from the Rayne Field in
Louisiana. When the Third Circuit Court of Appeals' "Catco" decision63
appeared to require Texas Eastern to prove that the proposed sale price
for its gas was justified by the public's convenience and necessity,64
Continental withdrew its FERC application to sell Rayne Field gas to
Texas Eastern. The parties then reformulated the gas sale into a lease sale
to avoid FERC jurisdiction.6 5
At the time of the lease sale, the Rayne Field was well developed.66
Nineteen wells had been drilled, and seven more were to be drilled.67
Although estimates of available reserves were possible,68 the average cost
per Mcf of gas could not be accurately determined because the total
volume of gas which the lease sale transferred was unknown at the time
of sale. 69 Writing for the majority, Justice Harlan noted that federal regulatory statutes were not limited by the meaning which local or common
law ascribed to the statute's terminology. Terms in such statutes were to
be defined according to the purpose of the Act and the facts involved in
the economic relationship at issue.7 ° Thus a sale of a lease under state
law might still be a sale of natural gas under the Natural Gas Act. Harlan
noted that the lease sale was "in most respects, equivalent to conventional
sales of natural gas" which "unquestionably" would be subject to the
FERC's jurisdiction under Phillips L. ' Moreover, Harlan pointed to the
cancelled gas sale contract between the parties, noting that the lease sale
61. Id. at 401.
62. The contracts were actually executed by Louisiana Gas Corporation, a Delaware Corporation
formed by Texas Eastern to limit its liability in the transaction. See "Answering Brief on behalf of
intervenors El Paso Natural Gas Company, et al." app. B at 6a, Tenneco Oil Co. v. Federal Energy
Regulatory Comm'n decided with El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Sun Oil Co., 708 F.2d 1011 (5th Cir.
1983).
63. Public Service Comm'n v. Federal Power Comm'n, 257 F.2d 717 (3rd Cir.) aff'd sub nom,
Atlantic Refining Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 360 U.S. 378 (1959).
64. The "public's convenience and necessity" is the standard used in issuing certificates to
construct pipelines where FERC has jurisdiction. 15 U.S.C. 717(f) (1982).
65. 381 U.S. 392, 395-96 (1965).
66. Id. at 396.
67. 381 U.S. at 396, n.3.
68. Answering Brief of Intervenors El Paso Natural Gas Company, et al., Tenneco Oil Co. v.
Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, app. A, pg. 7a, citing Opinion 378, 29 F.P.C. 249, 254.
69. Public Service Comm'n v. Federal Power Comm'n, 543 F.2d 757, 783 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
70. 381 U.S. 395, 400 (1965).
71. Id. at 401.
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was only a change of methods and not of objectives.72 It was "perfectly
clear" that the lease sale "accomplished the transfer of large amounts of
natural gas to an interstate pipeline company for resale in other states.
That is the significant and determinative economic fact." 73
Having found the lease sale otherwise jurisdictional, Harlan then examined whether the lease sale came under the "production and gathering"
exception of section l(c) of the Natural Gas Act. He first disposed of the
timing question, holding that a sale of gas still in the ground could be a
jurisdictional sale of gas under PhillipsL.74 The intent of the Natural Gas
Act was to protect consumers against exploitive natural gas companies
by giving the FERC jurisdiction over all wholesale transfers of gas in
interstate commerce.75 Given this analysis, Harlan logically concluded
that the Rayne Field lease sale was not within the production and gathering
exception. Production and gathering extended only to physical activities,
processes and facilities used in the production and gathering of gas. 76
Harlan suggested that the "production and gathering" exception covered
those areas subject to state regulatory power.77
Harlan then distinguished Panhandle on grounds that the leasehold
transferred in Panhandle was undeveloped. In contrast, the Rayne Field
was substantially developed, with gas from Rayne Field flowing into
Texas Eastern's interstate pipeline immediately upon its connection to
the field.78 "The substantiality of development is a relevant consideration,
for the more that must be done before the gas begins its interstate journey,
the less the transaction resembles the conventional wellhead sale of natural
gas in interstate commerce which, as Phillips held, the Act affirmatively
placed within Commission jurisdiction." 7 9 Finally, Harlan limited the
Court's statement in Panhandle that "of course leases are an essential
part of production" to the particular facts in Panhandle, holding that the
statement "should not be considered as embracing each and every transfer
that can be put in lease form." 80
Following Rayne Field, the transfer of proven and substantially developed reserves to an interstate gas company for sale in interstate commerce was a transfer subject to FERC jurisdiction under the Natural Gas
Act. What was unknown were the parameters of "proven and substantially
developed." The leases in Panhandle Eastern were undeveloped and
72. Id.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id.
Id. at 402.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 403.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 404.
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hence within the "production and gathering" exception. 8 The leases in
Rayne Field were proven and substantially developed, hence equivalent
to a Phillips I wellhead sale.8" The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals articualted a test for when reserves are "proven and substantially developed"
in ContinentalOil Co. v. FederalPower Comm'n,8 3 commonly known as
the Ship Shoal decision.
Ship Shoal is an area off the coast of Louisiana covered by lease
interests held by the four Catco companies (Catco). Catco had developed
the leasehold to the extent of 17 wells, 4 seven completed85 as oil wells
and only one as a gas well. 86 Drilling on five other gas wells had commenced, but completion had been deferred.87 In the one completed gas
well there were two completions, with gas being found in 46 reservoirs
in 39 distinct sand zones.88 In addition, five sand reservoirs producing
oil were also producing gas. 9 The completed gas well had been shut-in
and no gas had actually been produced at the time of sale.'
In 1960, Catco and Tennessee Gas Supply Company (Tennessee), a
jurisdictional interstate pipeline company, entered into a gas lease sale
covering Catco's interest in the Ship Shoal area. The parties chose the
gas lease sale method because it produced the greatest cash flow for
Catco. 9' When Tennessee sought FERC approval for a pipeline to the
Ship Shoal area, the FERC sought to bring the lease sale arrangement
within its jurisdiction. 9
On appeal from the FERC's finding of jurisdiction over the lease sale,
the Fifth Circuit Court summarized Rayne Field into a three part test:
1. Is the economic effect of the transfer similar to that of a conventional
wellhead sale?
2. Is the subject of the transaction "proven and substantially devel• oped" reserves?
81. 337 U.S. 498, 504-05 (1949).
82. 381 U.S. 392, 401 (1965).
83. 370 F.2d 57 (5th Cir. 1966).
84. Brief for Intervenors El Paso Natural Gas Co. et al. in Tenneco Oil Co. v. Federal Energy
Regulatory Comm'n stated that the FPC hearing examiner found only twelve wells had been drilled.
The brief suggested the error was either a typographical error (7 for 2) or the Court erroneously
included the five deferred wells with the twelve actually drilled wells. App. A, at 15a, n.2.
85. The "completion" of a well is the process of inserting casings into the well to protect it from
water, earth and sand, and to protect fresh water zones from fluids used and produced in the drilling
process. The method used varies with the type of reservoir and formation. For technical discussion,
see ENERGY TECHNOLOGY HANDBOOK 3-129 to 133 (D. Consadine ed. 1977).
86.
86. 370 F.2d 57, 59 (5th Cir. 1967).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 59.
91. Id. at 60.
92. Id. at 59.
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3. Is the transfer for the purpose of interstate transmission and resale?93
The court then interpreted "proven and substantially developed" to mean:
has the leasehold been sufficiently developed and proven for imminent
production of gas in commercial quantities?94
The court applied this rewritten test to the Rayne Field leases. The
court found they passed easily: 19 of 26 wells had been completed at the
time of sale, gas began flowing into an interstate pipeline immediately
upon connection with the field, and the FERC considered the field "fully
developed." 95 Then the court applied the test to the Ship Shoal leases.
The court found the Ship Shoal field had reached the stage of proof and
development necessary to be jurisdictional under Rayne Field.9 6 The court
listed five factors in reaching its decision:
1. The reserves were sufficiently proven as shown by the faith Tennessee put in its expert estimates of the field. Tennessee invested
$97 million on its faith in estimates of the recoverable reserves.97
Further, Tennessee's readiness to connect its pipeline was a strong
indication that Ship Shoal was "substantially developed" at the time
of the lease sale. 98
2. Tennessee relied heavily on the Ship Shoal reserves in making its
FERC pipeline application and the FERC normally granted pipeline
applications only if gas would begin moving through the line within
one year of certification. 99 The adequacy of the Ship Shoal reserves
was essential to support Tennessee's application. "
3. Ship Shoal had the imminent ability to produce gas in commercial
quantities because gas from the one completed well could have been
drawn up and produced immediately. Moreover, evidence showed
that ten percent of Ship Shoal's reserves could be recovered within
four years of the commencement of production. 0 '
4. While between thirty-five and forty wells would be necessary to
fully develop the leasehold, the number of wells necessary to fully
develop was irrelevant to the field's imminent ability to produce.'o
The court's focus appeared to be on whether the field could currently
produce gas
and not on whether the field was close to full devel3
opment. 11
93. Id. at 62. The court did not indicate how a court should weigh these factors. See infra n. 109
and accompanying text.
94. Id. at 63-64.
95. Id. at 64.
96. Id. at 65.
97. Id. at 64-65.
98. Id. at 65.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 66.
102. Id.
103. Compare with the El Paso court's discussion on this issue, 708 F.2d 1011, 1018-19 (5th
Cir. 1983).
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5. Finally, the substantial economic and "crucial" fact was that the
lease sale accomplished the transfer of large quantities of proven
reserves of gas to an interstate pipeline company for eventual resale
in interstate commerce. o
THE COURT'S DECISION
In the El Paso decision, the Fifth Circuit saw the Natural Gas Act's
limitations on FERC jurisdiction as expressing congressional intent to
leave intrastate transactions and production and gathering to state regulation. °5 The court determined that all three parts of the Ship Shoal
interpretation of Rayne Fieldshould be weighed equally. " Thus the court
found that the administrative law judge and the FERC had misapplied
Rayne Field by making the "economic effect" criterium, the first part of
the Ship Shoal test, the determining factor in the jurisdictional analysis.'0 7
The court noted that, carried to its logical extreme, the FERC's position
would make all transfers of leasehold interests to interstate pipeline companies subject to FERC jurisdiction.' 8 "While the Commission's downplaying of the development issue may well foreshadow the next stage in
the evolution of the law, for the time being our precedents demand full
application of all components of the Rayne Field test ..."19
The Court felt the San Juan Basin reserves were proven within the
meaning of Rayne Field. However, the court found the Basin not substantially developed because of the lack of the imminent ability to produce
in commercial quantities, the second criterium in the Ship Shoal analysis." ' The important factors in the court's decision were the limited
development of the San Juan Basin at the time of the lease sale, and the
"massive efforts" needed to make the Basin commercially productive."'
Most importantly, the court equated "commercially productive" with the
extent to which the Basin had reached full development." 2 "Since substantial development turns on whether the acreage is capable of imminent
production . . . in commercial quantities . . . it stands to reason that the
actual number of wells in comparison to the number needed to complete
production ...is a relevant factor."" ' 3 Using GLA-47 as an example,
the court noted that only 26 of 960 wells allowed by state siting laws
104. Id.
105. 708 F.2d at 1016.
106. Id. at 1017-18.
107. Id. at 1018.
108. Id. at 1019.
109. Id. at 3018.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1018-19.
112. Id. Contrast with the Court's analysis in Ship Shoal, 370 F.2d 57, 65 (5th Cir. 1966). See
infra nn. 102-03 and accompanying text.
113. 708 F.2d at 1019.
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existed at the time of the lease sale." 4 While the court noted that "a few"
GLAs showed substantial development, both parties had approached the
jurisdiction question on a fieldwide basis rather than an individual lease
basis."' 5 The fact that El Paso could have tied a few wells into its system
shortly after the lease sale did not demonstrate the imminent ability to
produce in commercial quantities." 6 Finally, the court noted that the few
wells in the ground at the time of the lease sales could not have depleted
the formation. "'
ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S DECISION
Following the El Paso decision, the FERC's jurisdiction over hybrid
gas transactions in the Fifth Circuit can be summarized as follows: The
FERC has jurisdiction over the sale of leases to an interstate pipeline
company where that sale accomplishes the transfer of proven and substantially developed reserves for transportation or sale in interstate commerce. "' To determine if a lease sale is within FERC jurisdiction, courts
should examine three factors, giving all equal weight: (1) Is the economic
effect of the transfer similar to that of a conventional wellhead sale? (2)
Do the leases cover proven and substantially developed reserves? (3) Is
the transfer for the purpose of interstate transportation or sale?' In determining the answer to the second factor, courts must examine whether
the transferred leasehold has been sufficiently developed and proven for
imminent production of gas in commercial quantities to take place."'2 In
determining whether the leasehold is capable of production in commercial
quantities, courts should examine the ratio of wells drilled at the
time of
2
transfer to the number needed to fully develop the leasehold.' '
The El Paso court presumed that all three factors in its three-part Rayne
Field test should be given equal weight, and the court castigated the
22
FERC for raising the economic effect factor above the other two factors. 1
Yet both the Rayne Field and Ship Shoal opinions appear to give greater
weight to the effect of the transfer than to the substantiality of the development of the leases being transferred. By allowing the amount of
114. Id. at 1018. The 960 was computed as follows: 102,400 acres in GLA-47. One well drilling
the Mesa Verde formation allowed per 320 acres = 320 allowable wells + One Pictured Cliffs
formation well allowed per 160 acres = 640 allowable wells, total of 960. Id.
115. Id. at 1018-19.
116. Id. at 1019.
117. Id.
118. United Gas Improvement Co. v. Continental Oil Co. (Rayne Field), 381 U.S. 392 (1965).
119. Continental Oil Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n (Ship Shoal), 370 F.2d 57, 62 (5th Cir.
1966).
120. Id. at 63-64.
121. El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Sun Oil Co., 708 F.2d 1011, 1018 (5th Cir. 1983).
122. Id.
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development at the time of the lease transfer to negate FERC jurisdiction
over the transfer, the El Paso court has in effect adopted a "timing of
the transaction" test explicitly rejected in Rayne Field.2 3 The Rayne Field
court held that "even though a sale of natural gas in interstate commerce
occurs before production or gathering is ended, it is nonetheless subject
to regulation. "'2 4 The El Paso court held that the FERC lacks jurisdiction
over a transfer of leases unless the substantiality of development at the
time of transfer approaches that in Rayne Field. The message to producers
wanting to avoid FERC regulation is to schedule the lease sale early in
the development of the gas field.
The most striking thing about the El Paso decision is the absence of
the Ship Shoal opinion. While the court dutifully cited to Ship Shoal,
and used the test set out in that opinion, the court ignored the factual
basis on which that opinion was based. The court found the San Juan
Basin leases were within the production and gathering exception by comparing their development to the development of the Rayne Field leases.
It was Ship Shoal which interpreted the meaning of the term "proven
and substantially developed," yet the Ship Shoal leases would fail the El
Paso court's substantiality of development test. The court found the San
Juan Basin leases at issue in El Paso were within the production and
gathering exception by comparing their development to the 73 percent
development' 25 of the Rayne Field leases. The leasehold covered by GLA47, the lease specifically mentioned by the El Paso court, was 2.8 percent
was only 2.5
developed at the time of sale. 26 The Ship Shoal leasehold
127
percent to 2.9 percent developed at the time of sale.
The El Paso court's reliance on the wells-drilled ratio is at odds with
Ship Shoal's handling of the "imminent ability to produce in commercial
quantities" question. The court in Ship Shoal found the leasehold sufficiently developed with only one producing well because gas from the
two completions in that well could have been drawn up and immediately
produced. The El Paso and Ship Shoal courts disagree on the relevance
of how close the leasehold is to full development in determining whether
123. 381 U.S. at 402.
124. Id. "
125. Calculated as 19 wells at the time of transfer with full development at 26 wells. 381 U.S.
392, 396, n. 3 (1965).
126. Computed as follows: 102,400 acres in the leasehold. One Mesa Verde formation well
allowed per 320 acres, or 320 Mesa Verde wells allowed in GLA-47 (320 squared = 102,400).
One Pictured Cliffs formation well allowed per 160 acres, or 640 Pictured Cliffs wells allowed, total
of 960 wells allowed. There were 27 wells at the time of sale, or 2.8% of total development. 708
F.2d 1011, 1018 (5th Cir. 1983).
127. Comuted as one well at the time of sale with 34 to 40 necessary to determine the volume
of the gas field. I presume here that the number of wells necessary to accurately determine the field's
volume is "full development," though it seems more than that would be drilled. 370 F.2d 57, 66
(5th Cir. 1966).
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the leasehold has the imminent ability to produce in commercial quantities. The Ship Shoal court stated that:
It may well be that Ship Shoal is a 'long way' from being fully
developed. Catco anticipated that from 34 to 40 additional completions would be necessary to calculate the final consideration in the
seventh year redetermination of reserves. But this problem relates
of final consideration than to imminent ability
more to determination
8
for production. 1
The El Pasocourt stated: "Since substantial development turns on whether
the acreage is capable of imminent production of natural gas in commercial quantities . . . (citing Ship Shoal) it stands to reason that the
actual number of wells in comparison to the number needed to complete
production from the land is a relevant factor. "129
The El Paso decision opens a vast exception to federal regulation of
natural gas prices under the Natural Gas Act. The opinion sets up a
situation in which neither state nor federal government can regulate the
price at which an interstate pipeline company purchases proven reserves
of gas for the express purpose of transporting and selling the gas in other
states. 130
It seems much more logical to define the limits of the "production and
gathering" exception in terms of commerce clause and federalism rather
than in terms of the number of wells drilled at the time of sale. 3 ' FERC's
jurisdiction under the Natural Gas Act ought to be defined to reach wher128. Id. at 66.
129. 708 F.2d at 1019.
130. The State of New Mexico lacks the power to regulate the price at which a Texas-based,
interstate pipeline company sells New Mexico gas to its California customers. A state's power to
regulate the sale price of gas is limited to direct sales to the ultimate consumers in the state. Panhandle
Eastern Pipeline Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 332 U.S. 507, 514-515 (1947). Likewise, the state
of California lacks the power to regulate the price at which El Paso acquires the gas it sells to its
California customers. Under the Hinshaw Amendment, 15 U.S.C. 717(c) (1982), California may
regulate the California distributors of El Paso gas. Michigan Gas Storage Co. v. Michigan Pub.
Service Comm'n, 72 Mich. App. 384, 249 N.W.2d 422 (1976) rev'd on other grounds 405 Mich.
376, 275 N.W.2d 457 (1979). However, California cannot regulate the price at which an interstate
pipeline sells its gas to a state distributor. Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Co. v. Public Service Comm'n,
332 U.S. 507, 515 (1947). In the El Paso situation, neither state can regulate the lease sale: No gas
is sold to New Mexico consumers yet California cannot reach out to New Mexico to regulate the
lease sale prices.
131. In Rayne Field, Justice Harlan explained that the Court's construction of the 'production
and gathering' exception "in no way" interfered with "state regulatory power over the physical
processes of production or gathering in furtherance of conservation or other legitimate state concerns."
381 U.S. 392, 402-03 (1965). Similarly in Phillips 1, Justice Minton noted that a great part of the
"gap" which the Natural Gas Act was intended to fill was created by cases holding that "the regulation
of wholesale rates of gas and electrical energy moving in interstate commerce is beyond the constitutional powers of the States." 347 U.S. 672, 683 (1954), citing Interstate Natural Gas Co. v.
Federal Power Comm'n, 331 U.S. 682, 689 (1947). See also Federal Power Comm'n v. Panhandle
Eastern Pipeline Co., 337 U.S. 498, 503 (1949).
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ever the states's regulatory jurisdiction cannot. Such an interpretation of
FERC jurisdiction would further the purpose of the Natural Gas Act: To
protect consumers from exploitation by natural gas suppliers by regulating
the price at which large
quantities of gas are transported and sold in
132
interstate commerce.
DALE EPPLER

132. 381 U.S. 392, 402 (1965).

